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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HOEVELER, Senior District Judge: 
 
Floyd Jacobs appeals from a final judgment of conviction 
and sentence requesting that his sentence be vacated and 
remanded to the District Court for re-sentencing on three 
separate grounds. We affirm the District Court's conclusion 
that Jacobs is to pay full restitution to the victim under the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.A. S3663A. We 
also affirm the District Court's application of a six level 
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. S2A2.2(b)(3)(C), 
Infliction of Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury. 
We vacate Jacobs' sentence and remand for a more detailed 
explanation in accordance with Third Circuit precedent as 
to the basis of the sentencing court's five-level upward 
departure pursuant to S5K2.3, Extreme Psychological 
Injury. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault on his 
former girlfriend, Rebecca West, on federal property in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S113(a)(3). Jacobs pled guilty to the 
charge on June 17, 1997. 
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The written plea agreement contained the following 
stipulations: (1) the applicable Sentencing Guideline was 
U.S.S.G. S2A2.2, which provides a base offense level of 15; 
(2) a dangerous weapon was used during the assault 
requiring an upward adjustment of 4 points appropriate 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S2A2.2(b)(2)(B); and (3) since Jacobs 
pled guilty on a timely basis and therefore accepted 
responsibility for his crime, he was entitled to a downward 
adjustment of 3 points, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S3E1.1(a) and 
(b)(2). After an evidentiary hearing on the degree of injury 
Jacobs inflicted upon the victim for the specific offense 
characteristic under S2A2.2, the Court found that the 
victim had sustained "permanent or life-threatening bodily 
injury" and applied the six level upward adjustment under 
U.S.S.G. S2A2.2(b)(3)(C). Therefore, based upon an Offense 
Level of 22 and a Criminal History Category of II, the 
Guidelines range was 46-57 months. The Court then 
informed the parties before the sentencing that it would 
entertain a motion for an upward departure pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S5K2.3 regarding infliction of "extreme 
psychological injury" upon the victim. After a review of 
treatment and examination records by various mental 
health professionals, the Court found that Jacobs had 
inflicted extreme psychological injury upon the victim, and 
thus departed five levels above the adjusted offense level. 
Thus, the total offense level became 27 with a Guidelines 
range of 78-97 months. Jacobs was sentenced to a 96 
month term of imprisonment. Appellant's Appendix at 57- 
69. An evidentiary hearing was held regarding restitution 
wherein Jacobs was ordered to pay the full amount of 
monetary damages suffered by the victim and her health 
insurance carrier in the amount of $27,470.17. Appellant's 
Appendix at 74-123. Jacobs filed this appeal on November 
26, 1997, and on September 18, 1998 this Court heard oral 
argument. 
 
In his appeal, Jacobs makes three arguments. First, he 
contends that the District Court erred in imposing a six 
level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. S2A2.2(b)(3)(C), 
infliction of permanent or life-threatening injury. Second, 
he asserts that the Court erred in upwardly departing five 
levels and that the Court also erred on the degree of the 
departure due to insufficient findings that Jacobs had 
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inflicted "extreme psychological injury" upon the victim. 
Third, he argues that the Court should not have ordered 
him to pay full restitution pursuant to the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. S3663A. 
 
The government responds that the court properly 
concluded that a six level enhancement was warranted on 
the basis of findings that Jacobs had indeed inflicted 
permanent bodily injury and life threatening injury, the 
prerequisites for imposing an enhanced penalty under 
S2A2.2(b)(3)(C). The government also argues that there was 
more than enough evidence on record that Jacobs' assault 
had caused the victim extreme psychological injury. Finally, 
the government asserts that the District Court committed 
no error in awarding restitution, as the statute clearly 
mandates full restitution. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
The first questions with which this Court is faced are 
Jacobs' contentions that an award of full restitution to the 
victim was not warranted in his case, and his argument 
that the amount of restitution that represented lost wages 
was awarded in error because West had been fully paid by 
her employer for time off from work. There can be little said 
about these arguments since the statute at issue is clear 
and straightforward. Plenary review is the standard for the 
determination that the restitution award is permitted, while 
the amount of the particular award is reviewed for clear 
error, as it rests on the facts of the particular case. United 
States v. Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 493 (3d Cir. 1995). Upon 
consideration of the record and with the benefit of oral 
argument, we affirm the judgment of the District Court that 
Jacobs pay full restitution to the victim in the amount of 
$27,470.17. 
 
On the first point, Jacobs argues that the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.A. S3663A (MVRA), is 
susceptible to an interpretation which would have 
permitted the trial court in his case to consider awarding 
partial restitution instead of the full restitution that was 
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awarded against him.1 Jacobs represented at a restitution 
hearing that this partial restitution argument was one of 
first impression, but the trial court apparently did not 
consider it and awarded full restitution. We find that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that this case was appropriate for a restitution remedy, and 
also correctly interpreted the statute as mandating full 
restitution, an interpretation that is in line with the plain 
language of the statute and also with several opinions on 
the subject by other courts. United States v. Duncan, 1998 
WL 558756 at *1 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Juvenile 
G.Z., 144 F.3d 1148 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Baggett, 125 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 
Section 3663A(a)(1) states in relevant part, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, when 
sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in 
subsection (c), the court shall order ... that the defendant 
make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim 
is deceased, to the victim's estate." Jacobs' offense clearly 
falls within subsection (c)(1)(B); an identifiable victim or 
victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. 
Most importantly, companion S3664 -- Procedure for 
issuance and enforcement of order of restitution-- clearly 
mandates full restitution in subsection (f)(1)(A):"[i]n each 
order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each 
victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as 
determined by the court and without consideration of the 
economic circumstances of the defendant." Emphasis added. 
These two sections were 1996 amendments to the MVRA 
and most telling, subsection (f)(1)(A) replaced deleted 
subsection (a), which had required the sentencing court to 
consider the financial resources and needs of the 
defendant. 
 
Although Jacobs makes some interesting statutory 
construction arguments, they simply cannot override the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Jacobs' argument, that since S3664(a) requires the defendant to 
provide the probation department with an affidavit identifying his 
resources his financial circumstances must be taken into consideration, 
is without merit given the clear language in the MVRA to the contrary. 
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clear and unambiguous mandatory language of the MVRA, 
especially in light of the fact that the recent amendments to 
the MVRA squarely defeat his arguments. Moreover, at least 
four other circuits have also found that the MVRA is a 
mandate requiring full restitution for certain crimes (see 
cases listed above). The Court finds that the District Court 
did not abuse it discretion in awarding full restitution to 
the victim. 
 
B. 
 
Jacobs' second argument is that the District Court erred 
in finding that lost "annual leave" and "restored leave" 
which West had to expend when her sick leave was 
exhausted were "lost wages" under the MVRA. This 
argument is based on the fact that West was paid by her 
employer during her leave. However, the District Court 
accepted evidence that had West not been forced to expend 
annual and restored leave, she would have been entitled to 
a lump-sum cash payment for any unused leave in the 
event of resignation or retirement as a federal employee 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. S5551. 
 
Whether or not the economic loss occasioned by the loss 
of annual and restored leave is properly termed"lost wages" 
as it was occasionally referred to at both hearings on 
restitution is not important to this Court's conclusion that 
the District Court was correct in concluding that such loss 
was a proper component of the restitution award. The 
applicable section of the MVRA is S3663A(b)(2)(C) which 
states in relevant part that "[t]he order of restitution shall 
require that such defendant, in the case of an offense 
resulting in bodily injury to the victim, reimburse the victim 
for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense." 
Since the District Court concluded that West would have 
been entitled to a lump sum payment had she not had to 
use her annual and restored leave, the District Court made 
sufficient findings that the income in the form of a future 
lump sum payment to be made was lost as a result of 
Jacobs' offense. 
 
Finally, Jacobs argues that even if the annual and 
restored leave are properly part of the restitution 
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calculation, the dollar value per day of this leave 
attributable to his crime was not proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. We will not disturb the 
District Court's findings that the dollar value of these two 
types of leave, along with all other types of pecuniary losses 
for which restitution was ordered, were caused by Jacobs' 
assault. The District Court had before it numerous records 
from treating physicians, the victim's insurer, the victim's 
employer, and the Department of the Army, establishing the 
number of months the victim was unable to work, the 
dollar amount of medical services for the victim, and the 
amount of annual, unpaid, and restored leave that the 
victim lost while recuperating from her injuries. From this 
evidence, the District Court made findings that the 
amounts were accurate and found as a fact that the 
government had sustained its burden under the MVRA of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobs' 
assault upon the victim was the cause of these losses. 
Appellant's Appendix at 88, 108-111. Moreover, the 
government correctly points out that no contrary evidence 
regarding the amounts or the items considered in the 
restitution calculation was presented. The District Court's 
conclusions as to amount and causation of loss were a 
proper exercise of discretion. 
 
III. 
 
The second question we must address is Jacobs' 
contention that the sentencing court erred in applying a six 
level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. S2A2.2(b)(3)(C), 
which provides for a six level enhancement if a victim 
suffers permanent or life threatening injury from an 
aggravated assault. The standard of review for the District 
Court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines is 
plenary. United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 864 (3d Cir. 
1995). The victim here clearly suffered bodily injury as a 
result of stab wounds, and thus the application of 
S2A2.2(b)(3) was appropriate. However, we must determine 
whether the District Court made sufficient factualfindings 
to support a specific offense characteristic enhancement of 
six levels, the highest increase available underS2A2.2(b)(3). 
See United States v. Fiorelli, 133 F.3d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 
 
                                7 
  
1998) (citing with approval District Court's specific findings 
justifying increase). Factual findings in relation to 
sentencing issues are reviewed for clear error. Felton, 55 
F.3d at 864. 
 
Application Note 1(h) of U.S.S.G. S1B1.1 defines 
"permanent or life-threatening bodily injury" as "injury 
involving a substantial risk of death; loss or substantial 
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or 
mental faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an obvious 
disfigurement that is likely to be permanent." While Jacobs 
in fact admits that some increase for bodily injury was 
warranted in this case, he asserts that S2A2.2(b)(C)(3) 
contemplates more serious injures than West suffered when 
referring to "permanent bodily injury" and that West's 
injuries were less serious than the District Court 
determined. He also argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to find that the assault involved a "substantial 
risk of death." This is simply not the case. 
 
After accepting evidence, conducting hearings, and 
hearing argument, the District Court adopted express 
findings (1) that the elevated and prominent scar on the 
victim's face was an obvious disfigurement that is likely to 
be permanent, Appellant's Appendix at 23; (2) that Jacobs 
had inflicted injuries that left permanent scars all over the 
victim's body, Appellant's Appendix at 68; and (3) that the 
stabbing to the victim's face, mouth, chest, back and 
abdomen involved a substantial risk of death, Appellant's 
Appendix at 23-24.2 Moreover, the District Court also found 
at the later hearing on the restitution issue that Jacobs' 
assault upon the victim had caused an intestinal 
obstruction requiring emergency surgery (a colostomy), in 
accordance with the operating physician's conclusions.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Jacobs argues that the District Court "specifically decided not to 
consider the medical reports regarding Ms. West" which categorized her 
injuries as "superficial" and "non-penetrating." This Court finds that the 
record does not support this allegation, and in any event, the point is 
meritless since the sentencing court made findings of fact for the six 
level increase on two separate grounds, i.e., that the injuries were 
permanent and life-threatening. 
 
3. The sentencing court did not commit error in refraining from crediting 
Jacobs' speculative efforts, without any expert support, to present other 
possible causes for the intestinal obstruction. 
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Appellant's Appendix at 77-81. These findings comport with 
the definition of "permanent or life-threatening bodily 
injury" found in Application Note 1(h) of U.S.S.G. S1B1.1. 
Moreover, since S2A2.2(b)(3)(C) is phrased in the 
disjunctive, a finding of either permanent bodily injury or 
life-threatening injury would have sufficed to bring Jacobs' 
conduct within the guidelines section. The district judge 
thus found that the facts supported both alternatives for 
applicability of the section, when facts supporting either 
one would have been adequate. The fact that there are 
cases that have found other, arguably more severe, injuries 
as permanent or life threatening bodily injuries under 
S2A2.2(b)(3)(C) is of no moment given the District Court's 
findings in this case and this Court's independent review of 
the record. 
 
Having already concluded that application of S2A2.2(b)(3) 
was appropriate, we find that the District Court sufficiently 
and adequately stated a factual basis for the finding of 
permanent or life-threatening injury justifying a six level 
enhancement. There was no clear error that would justify 
disturbing the sentencing court's conclusions. 
 
IV. 
 
The final issue Jacobs argues on appeal is that the 
District Court improperly departed five levels pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S5K2.3, based on a finding that Jacobs inflicted 
"extreme psychological injury" upon the victim.4 We review 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 5K2.3, "Extreme Psychological Injury (Policy Statement)" states 
in relevant part that: 
 
       If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more 
       serious than that normally resulting from commission of the 
offense, 
       the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline 
       range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the 
       severity of the psychological injury and the extent to which the 
       injury was intended or knowingly risked. 
 
       Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to 
       warrant application of this adjustment only when there is a 
       substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, 
emotional, 
       or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is 
likely 
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a District Court's decision to depart from the guidelines for 
abuse of discretion. United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 
862 (3d Cir. 1997).5 We find that the sentencing judge did 
not make the specific factual findings required for an 
appropriate departure based on "extreme psychological 
injury" resulting to the victim from Jacobs' assault. We also 
find Jacobs' argument that the district judge should have 
specifically articulated the reasons for the degree of the 
departure convincing. Under this Circuit's precedent of 
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), 
we must conclude that the district judge did not engage in 
the analogic reasoning that is required in arriving at a five 
level departure, as opposed to some other numerical level of 
departure. We therefore vacate the sentence on these two 
separate but related grounds and remand for re-sentencing 
in accordance with the discussion of Third Circuit 
precedent below. 
 
As we stated in Baird, S5K2.0, Grounds for Departure, 
provides a roadmap for a decision to depart from the 
applicable Guidelines range. Baird, 109 F.3d at 870-71. A 
court may depart from the range if it finds "that there exists 
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to 
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 
U.S.C. S3553(b); 1997 U.S.S.G. S5K2.0. "Sentencing courts 
are not left adrift, however." United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 
81, 94 (1996). Factors that are encouraged as bases for 
departures are found in SS 5K2.1-5K2.18. One such 
encouraged factor is an upward departure based on a 
finding of "extreme psychological injury" to the victim. 
U.S.S.G. S5K2.3. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the 
       impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms 
       or by changes in behavior patterns. The court should consider the 
       extent to which such harm was likely, given the nature of the 
       defendant's conduct. 
 
5. We note that facts relevant to the departure in this case generally 
need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. Baird, 109 F.3d 
at 865 n.8 (five-level departure is not extreme enough to require proof by 
the clear and convincing standard). 
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Section 5K2.3 is entitled "Extreme Psychological Injury." 
It provides the following authority: 
 
       If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury 
       much more serious than that normally resulting from 
       commission of the offense, the court may increase the 
       sentence above the authorized guideline range. 
 
Thus, a court invoking the authority of S5K2.3 must find 
that a victim suffered psychological injury "much more 
serious than that normally resulting from the commission 
of the [particular] offense" for which the defendant is being 
sentenced. United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, 1111-12 
(3d Cir. 1996) (the record must support a finding that "the 
victims suffered psychological . . . harm, which exceeded 
that occurring in the heartland of fraud offenses, to such a 
degree as to justify an upward departure."); United States v. 
Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The evidence 
supports the District Court's findings that [the defendant's] 
victims suffered much more psychological injury than that 
normally resulting from the commission of a wire fraud 
offense."). See also, United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 
337, 340 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the record did not 
support departure because the state's therapist was unable 
to say that the eight-year-old sexual abuse victim suffered 
greater than normal psychological harm); United States v. 
Luscier, 983 F.2d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (evidence did 
not support departure in light of expert's testimony that the 
victim suffered a normal psychological reaction to 
attempted stabbing, and to the fatal stabbing of the victim's 
aunt); United States v. Fawbush, 946 F.2d 584, 586 (8th 
Cir. 1991) (despite the Presentence Report's assertion of 
greater than normal psychological harm to a sexual abuse 
victim of tender age, the evidence did not show that"either 
victim suffered psychological harm greater than that 
normally resulting from sexual abuse"); and United States 
v. Bond, 22 F.3d 662, 671-72 (6th Cir. 1994) (upward 
departure unwarranted because the bank tellers' anxiety 
after robbery was not sufficiently unusual). 
 
The District Court in this case found that the victim was 
suffering from "posttraumatic stress disorder, from mood 
disorders, from depression, anxiety, sleeplessness." 
Appellant's Appendix at 57-8. It further concluded that her 
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condition constituted "a substantial impairment of her 
psychological emotional function," that this"impairment 
will be of an extended and continuous duration," and that 
this "impairment manifests itself by physical or 
psychological symptoms or changes in behavioral pattern" 
(i.e., anxiety, depression, sleeplessness). Appellant's 
Appendix at 58. The District Court did not , however, find 
that the victim's psychological injury was "much more 
serious than that normally resulting from the commission" 
of the crime of aggravated assault. Nor is such afinding 
compelled by the current record.6 Such a finding is a 
prerequisite for a departure under SK2.3. 
 
Apparently, the District Court focused its attention on 
the following portion of S5K2.3 that explains the types of 
situations in which the authority provided in the initial, 
above-quoted sentence of S5K2.3 may be found to exist: 
 
       Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently 
       severe to warrant application of this adjustment only 
       when there is a substantial impairment of the 
       intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral 
       functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely 
       to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when 
       the impairment manifests itself by physical or 
       psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior 
       patterns. 
 
The District Court may have viewed this sentence as 
providing a definition of, and thus a substitute for, the 
requirement that there be "psychological injury much more 
serious than that normally resulting from commission of 
the offense." This view is inconsistent with the text. It is 
apparent from the phrase "only when" that this explanatory 
sentence is intended to provide a presumptive floor for the 
operation of S5K2.3. The situation normally should at least 
involve a substantial impairment, an extended or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court stated that it found "nothing ordinary about this 
particular assault" and that the "psychological injury suffered is 
extreme." Appellant's Appendix at 59. However, these statements alone 
do not allow for the conclusion that the harm suffered is above the level 
of, or more serious than that normally experienced by a victim of an 
aggravated assault. 
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continuous duration, and a manifestation of symptoms 
before the court should consider applying S5K2.3. 
Conversely, the "only when" of this explanatory sentence 
also implies that there will be cases in which these three 
factors will be present and the court will nonetheless be 
unable to find that the psychological injuries are"much 
more serious than those normally resulting from the 
commission of the offense." Because the explanatory 
sentence relied upon by the District Court is not a 
surrogate for a finding of injury beyond the heartland of 
injuries from the same offense, the findings of the 
sentencing court do not support its upward departure. 
 
In addition, we must be satisfied that the extent of the 
departure was reasonable, judged against the objective 
standards of the Guidelines themselves. Kikumura, 918 
F.2d at 1110; Baird, 109 F.3d at 872. Having first 
determined the appropriateness of a S5K2.3 departure by 
engaging in the required factual analysis, the Guidelines 
must then be examined to determine the extent of the 
departure. The District Court must undertake the"analogic 
reasoning" that Kikumura often requires. Baird, 109 F.3d at 
872. This analogic reasoning consists of fixing the extent of 
the departure by reference to an applicable counterpart in 
the Guidelines. United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 
999 (3d Cir. 1992). When departure by analogy is 
appropriate, the District Court should "ordinarily do so only 
to the extent of the most nearly analogous Guideline." 
United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990).7 
We note however, that analogies to the Guidelines, as 
opposed to applications of the Guidelines, are "necessarily 
more open-textured." Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1113. 
 
The District Court on remand may find helpful guidance 
in S2.2A2(b) of the aggravated assault guideline. That 
section provides in part: 
 
       (b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
       *** 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note our statement in Kikumura that the development of vehicles 
by the district courts other than analogy to a Guidelines section is not 
foreclosed. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1113. 
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       (2) (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 5 
           levels; (B) if a dangerous weapon (including a 
           firearm) was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; 
           (C) if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) 
           was brandished or its use was threatened, 
           increase by 3 levels. 
 
       (3) If the victim sustained bodily injury, increase the 
           offense level according to the seriousness of the 
           injury: 
 
         Degree of Bodily Injury        Increase in Level 
 
       (A) Bodily Injury                        add 2 
       (B) Serious Bodily Injury                add 4 
       (C) Permanent or Life-threatening 
       Bodily Injury                            add 6 
 
       (D) If the degree of injury is between that specified 
           in subdivisions (A) and (B), add 3 levels; or 
 
       (E) If the degree of injury is between that specified 
           in subdivision (B) and (C), add 5 levels. 
 
       Provided, however, that the cumulative adjustments 
       from (2) and (3) shall not exceed 9 levels.8 
 
Under S1B1.1(j), "serious bodily injury" includes the 
"protracted impairment of . . . [a] mental faculty." Under 
S1B1.1(h), "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury" 
includes a "substantial impairment of [a] mental faculty 
that is likely to be permanent." These definitions do not, as 
Jacobs argues, mean that in an aggravated assault context, 
S2A2.2(b) takes into account all of the extraordinary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. While the discussion above relates to the analogic reasoning required 
for a finding of extreme psychological injury and because this cause is 
being remanded for findings consistent with our views, we note in 
passing an apparent problem that exists with the sentence imposed 
pursuant to the aggravated assault guideline. The district court imposed 
a four level enhancement under (b)(2) based on the use of a knife and a 
six level enhancement under (b)(3) based on the physical injury to the 
victim. This would appear to be inconsistent with the nine level cap 
imposed in the concluding sentence of (b)(3). No one raised this issue on 
appeal, but in view of the remand, we felt this observation was 
appropriate. 
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psychological injuries covered by S5K2.3.9 They may, 
however, provide a basis for inferring that the guidelines in 
an aggravated assault situation treat physical and non- 
physical injuries to a victim as being of substantially 
similar seriousness. If one draws such an inference, one 
may further conclude that it would be inconsistent with the 
approach of the Guidelines to depart upward four levels or 
more under S5K2.3 without finding that the extreme 
psychological injury was likely to be protracted. Conversely, 
one may conclude that it would be consistent with the 
approach of the Guidelines to depart upwards four levels if 
there is "extreme psychological injury," as defined in 
S5K2.3, that can be expected to be "protracted" but not 
"permanent." 
 
While we share these observations about a possible 
application of Kikumura in the context of this case, we 
would not, of course, confine the District Court to this 
approach. 
 
V. 
 
Upon consideration of the record and with the benefit of 
oral argument, we vacate the sentence to the extent 
described above. The matter shall be remanded to the 
District Court for re-sentencing in accordance with the 
discussion of Third Circuit precedent referred to herein. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Even if it did, there would be no double counting here as Jacobs 
suggests, because the six level enhancement invoked by the District 
Court under S2A2.2(b)(3)(C) was based solely on the physical injuries of 
the victim. 
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